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Loving and Reading in Sidney
by Gavin Alexander
In The Defence of Poesy Sidney aligns learning from the exemplary images of fic-
tion with falling in love. What may appear to be a lazy commonplace is more than that. 
Sidney’s Neoplatonic understanding of love is bound up with his Neoplatonic theory 
of reading. In both models the object is the idea that lies behind appearances. A reader 
must apprehend the “idea or fore- conceit” of the poet in order not only to admire his 
fictional characters but to understand “why and how” the poet made them, and thus to 
move from this gnosis to imitative praxis. Similarly, a lover climbs the Platonic lad-
der of love, from the beauty of the beloved to an idea of beauty and ultimately to the 
divine maker of that idea. In the Platonic tradition loving, writing, and reading are 
never far apart, because they share so much common ground. With this background in 
mind, Sidney’s representation of love in Astrophil and Stella and the Arcadia as a 
sort of readerly activity begins to look less casual. This article examines the sources and 
uses of Sidney’s imagery of loving reading and writing—which in the Arcadia cluster 
around Sidney’s representations of Argalus and Parthenia, and of Pyrocles and Philo-
clea. It suggests that Sidney is not only using his models of idealizing reading to add 
color and depth to his depiction of love but is—if we turn things round—thinking in a 
more subtly worked- out manner than in the Defence about the mechanisms through 
which his readers will read, be delighted, learn, be moved, and ultimately find them-
selves transformed.
THIS article is about both loving and reading in Sidney and about the things they have in common. My primary interest is in how we read, both according to Sidney’s theory in The Defence of Poesy 
and in practice when confronted by Sidney’s own works. But what have 
the theory and practice of reading got to do with love? The answer is, 
not only is the challenge of reading “aright” (Sidney’s word) a diffi-
cult one when the subject matter is love, as Sidney freely confesses, but 
also loving and reading stand frequently as metaphors for each other 
in Sidney’s writings. In examining this connection and its background 
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I shall be assuming that it is in metaphors that a poet like Sidney does 
some of his best thinking (as Aristotle says, an ability to use metaphor 
“is a sign of natural genius, as to be good at metaphor is to perceive 
resemblances”).1 And I shall be assuming that our approach to those 
metaphors should not be a matter simply of translating them back into 
literal terms but should rather be one of exploring and perhaps ampli-
fying or extending them. That is to say, I will not be doing the job of an 
intellectual historian on Sidney, elucidating a theory he may never have 
explicitly formulated. When critics apply too much logic to the Defence 
it tends to fall apart or at least to feel the strain.2 So I think it is worth 
taking his ideas about literature back into his own literary writings, to 
see how they look there and perhaps to add something to them from the 
associations that they develop in that setting.
I begin this essay by examining Sidney’s theory of reading as pre-
sented in The Defence of Poesy. I notice in the Defence an ambivalent evo-
cation of the Platonic theory of love and ask how committed Sidney 
was to this theory before suggesting that the questions of how read-
ing works and of the usefulness of Plato’s theory of love are for Sidney 
parallel or mutually answering questions. I trace Sidney’s develop-
ment of analogies between loving, reading, and artistic creation to his 
direct engagement with Plato, surveying the evidence for this (as well 
as the mediating role of Plotinus, Augustine, Mornay, and others) and 
paying particular attention to the role of the “idea or fore- conceit” in 
Sidney’s poetics. These analogies enable us to fill a gap in Sidney’s lit-
erary theory, for he otherwise leaves unaddressed how the poet’s idea 
1 Poetics, 1459a, in the translation of M. E. Hubbard, in Ancient Literary Criticism, ed. 
D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 122.
2 A tradition that began when, sometime between 1584 and 1586, Sidney himself 
asked William Temple to give him a detailed logician’s reading of the Defence (see William 
Temple’s “Analysis” of Sir Philip Sidney’s “Apology for Poetry,” ed. and trans. John Webster 
[Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance Studies, 1984]). For a repre-
sentative modern example, see A. Leigh Deneef, “Rereading Sidney’s Apology,” Journal 
of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 10 (1980): 155–91; the results are impressive in their 
terms, but in clarifying Sidney’s theory in theoretical terms, much ambiguity is lost. There 
have been several book- length studies of Sidney’s literary theory, each emphasising par-
ticular areas of its background to great revisionist effect, but each—to varying extents—
producing a consequently partial account. These include Forrest G. Robinson, The Shape of 
Things Known: Sidney’s “Apology” in its Philosophical Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972); Åke Bergvall, The “Enabling of Judgement”: Sir Philip Sidney and 
the Education of the Reader, Studia Anglistica Upsaliensia 70 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 1989); Michael Mack, Sidney’s Poetics: Imitating Creation (Washington, DC: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2005); and Robert E. Stillman, Sir Philip Sidney 
and the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitanism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
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is to be apprehended and imitated by the reader. I next examine the re-
lations of loving and reading in Sidney’s poetry and fiction, first in As-
trophil and Stella and then in the Arcadia. Sidney, I argue, is interested 
in developing the fundamentally asymmetric model of love in Plato 
(older lover who perceives the Platonic idea, younger beloved who is 
offered only reflections) in the direction of something more symmetri-
cal and mutual. He does this by activating the third element in that tri-
angle of analogy—lovers as readers as artists. The figure of Pygmalion, 
the idealizing artist who became a loving viewer, does important work 
here; Pygmalion was also used by Sidney’s student William Scott to 
elaborate his own Sidneian theory of loving artistic mimesis, and he pre-
sides over a key moment in Sidney’s narrative of the mutually idealiz-
ing love of Philoclea and Pyrocles in the Arcadia. Finally, I discuss an 
extended episode describing Philoclea’s growing, emulative, love for 
Pyrocles/Zelmane, an episode densely interwoven with the lexicon of 
Sidney’s literary theory that offers, in effect, a detailed narrative illus-
tration of a loving hermeneutics. I draw from it a Sidneian model of 
reading as a loving and mutually transformative process, whereby text 
and reader both idealize and reshape one another. Sidney’s poetic play 
with Platonic love, I conclude, leads him to what we can call a Platonic 
hermeneutics: a Sidneian model of interpretation with a distinctly Pla-
tonic shape.
* * *
Sidney’s theory of reading in The Defence of Poesy appears to be overly 
simplistic at first glance. It concerns writing that deals in ideally good 
or bad characters rather than the more mixed characters of, for example, 
Aristotelian tragedy. With its metaphors of schoolboys and sweetened 
pills, it often appears to envisage interpretation as a passive affair, the 
poet tricking his readers into learning an edifying lesson when they 
think they are just enjoying a good story. When Sidney comes to the 
question of love, in the section of the Defence in which he refutes the 
various arguments against poetry, he sacrifices most literary practice in 
order to hold on to this theory:
They say the comedies rather teach than reprehend amorous conceits. They say 
the lyric is larded with passionate sonnets, the elegiac weeps the want of his 
mistress, and that even to the heroical Cupid hath ambitiously climbed. Alas, 
Love, I would thou couldst as well defend thyself as thou canst offend others; 
I would those on whom thou dost attend could either put thee away or yield 
good reason why they keep thee. But grant love of beauty to be a beastly fault 
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(although it be very hard, since only man and no beast hath that gift to dis-
cern beauty); grant that lovely name of love to deserve all hateful reproaches 
(although even some of my masters the philosophers spent a good deal of their 
lamp oil in setting forth the excellency of it); grant, I say, whatsoever they will 
have granted, that not only love but lust, but vanity, but—if they list—scurrility 
possesseth many leaves of the poets’ books: yet think I, when this is granted, 
they will find their sentence may with good manners put the last words fore-
most, and not say that poetry abuseth man’s wit, but that man’s wit abuseth 
poetry.3
Sidney might have done something else here. His parentheses show that 
he is thinking about Platonic love, and yet he does not attempt to rescue 
the literature of love by arguing that it might represent, directly or even 
allegorically, an ascent up a Platonic ladder of love to a divine idea of 
beauty. That some critics have made this argument about Sidney’s own 
works, and especially Astrophil and Stella,4 is a development Sidney per-
haps tried to forestall:
You that with allegorie’s curious frame,
 Of other’s children changelings use to make,
 With me those paines for God’s sake do not take:
I list not dig so deepe for brasen fame.
When I say “Stella”, I do meane the same
 Princess of Beautie, for whose only sake
 The raines of Love I love, though never slake[.]5
3 Sidney’s “The Defence of Poesy” and Selected Renaissance Literary Criticism, ed. Gavin 
Alexander (London: Penguin, 2004), 35; all further references are to this edition (“DP”) 
and are given parenthetically in the text. Since one purpose of this essay is to notice 
Sidney’s neglected contact with Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana, it is worth noting 
that the passage quoted ends with an Augustinian maneuver: see De Doctrina Christiana, 
ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), book 2, 36.54.132: “There 
are also certain rules of the more flamboyant discipline now called eloquence, which are 
valid in spite of the fact that they can be used to commend falsehood. Since they can also 
be used to commend the truth, it is not the subject itself that is reprehensible, but the per-
versity of those who abuse it.” All further references are to the text and translation of this 
edition (“DDC”) and give consecutively the book number and the passage reference ac-
cording to all three current systems of numbering.
4 See for example the readings of the sequence in Tom W. N. Parker, Proportional Form 
in the Sonnets of the Sidney Circle: Loving in Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); 
Thomas P. Roche, Jr., Petrarch and the English Sonnet Sequences (New York: AMS Press, 
1989); and Frances A. Yates, “The Emblematic Conceit in Giordano Bruno’s De gli eroici 
furori and in the Elizabethan Sonnet Sequences,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld In-
stitutes 6 (1943): 101–21.
5 Astrophil and Stella 28, ll. 1–7; text of this and all further quotations from The Poems of 
Sir Philip Sidney, ed. William A. Ringler, Jr. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), using Ring-
ler’s sigla (in this case AS 28.1–7).
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But Sidney is hedging his bets, the enjambment after “I do meane the 
same” at the end of the fifth line allowing us for a moment to think that 
Astrophil is saying, “When I say Stella I mean Stella” before “Princess 
of Beautie” sets us thinking in a more Platonic direction again.
How committed is Sidney to the Platonic theory of love? He plays 
games with it, as Richard McCabe and others have shown, most notably 
in Astrophil and Stella.6 But I am not sure this need mean that he cannot 
on occasion take it very seriously indeed. Another question that pas-
sage from the Defence leads us to ask is whether Sidney can envisage 
anything being learned from a story about love, and if so, how? Once 
again, we can notice a road Sidney does not take. One of his key sources 
is Plutarch’s essay on how the young should be taught to read poetry,7 
in which Plutarch describes the job of teaching young readers to dis-
tinguish between the skill of the poet’s imitation and the moral value 
of what is represented.8 Homer’s Achilles is perfectly drawn, but he is 
not a perfect man. Just as, in life, people display good and bad charac-
teristics, so in fiction we are dealing not with entirely good and entirely 
bad characters but with mixed characters. An ability to come to a cor-
rect view of their virtues and vices, Sidney might have argued—and 
Spenser surely believes—is the sort of necessary life skill that can be 
developed by the reading of poetry.
I wish to suggest that these two questions—of Sidney’s commitment 
to the theory of Platonic love and of how readers learn—not only are 
intimately connected but to an extent answer each other. And this is 
because of an analogy he exploits in many places, between the relation 
6 McCabe, “Conflicts of Platonic Love and Sensual Desire in Astrophil and Stella,” in 
Literature and Learning in Medieval and Renaissance England, ed. John Scattergood (Black-
rock: Irish Academic Press, 1984), 103–26. John Roe nicely argues that Sidney moves from 
engagement (mostly by way of parody) with Ficinian Neoplatonism to a direct response 
to Plato’s myth of the cave in the later stages of the sequence: see “Italian Neoplaton-
ism and the Poetry of Sidney, Shakespeare, Chapman, and Donne,” in Platonism and the 
English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 103–7. For S. K. Heninger, Jr., “Astrophil’s loss of Stella may be seen 
metonymically as Sidney’s farewell to platonist idealism” (Sidney and Spenser: The Poet as 
Maker [University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989], 485).
7 Plutarch, Moralia, 14d– 37b, the essay known as “Quomodo adolescens poetas audire 
debeat” or “De audiendis poetis.” All references to and quotations from classical sources 
use the volumes in the Loeb Classical Library series unless otherwise stated. On Sidney’s 
use of this source, see Margaret W. Ferguson, “Sidney’s A Defence of Poetry: A Retrial,” 
Boundary 2: A Journal of Postmodern Literature 7 (1979): 61–95; and Bergvall, The “Enabling 
of Judgement,” 102–4.
8 See especially 17f– 18f and 25e– 28d. For this distinction, common enough in ancient 
literary criticism and poetry, cf. Aristotle, Poetics, 1460b13–15.
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of poet or text to reader and that of lover to beloved. This connection 
looks more highly charged when we notice that the literary- theoretical 
language of the Defence of Poesy is not confined to that work but is to 
be found in Sidney’s other writings too and especially in the Arcadia. 
Sidney cannot help using metaphors. We find one even in his central 
definition of poetry:
Poesy, therefore, is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in the word 
mimēsis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting or figuring forth—to speak 
metaphorically, a speaking picture—with this end: to teach and delight. (DP, 10)
This easy recourse to metaphors helps us to make connections between 
different areas of his thought and between his different works. We can 
witness a kind of slippage even within the Defence, when Sidney de-
scribes the role of the reader in terms that echo the job of the writer:
and therefore, as in history, looking for truth, they may go away full fraught 
with falsehood, so in poesy, looking but for fiction, they shall use the narration 
but as an imaginative ground- plot of a profitable invention. (DP, 34–35)
This passage is not always well glossed in editions of the Defence.9 The 
problem is that Sidney is describing what readers do with fictions but 
is using the images and concepts—“ground- plot,” “invention”—with 
which he likes to describe what poets do when they create those fictions. 
The poet finds material and designs his plot (the rhetorical stages of in-
ventio and dispositio); his readers, delighted, taught, and moved by the 
poet’s work, find in it material on which to base a redesign of their lives 
and selves: “an imaginative ground- plot of a profitable invention.”10 
(I shall return later to this notion of readerly praxis—the actions that 
follow interpretation—as a kind of writing.)
In a related passage in the “old” Arcadia, Sidney describes Pyrocles 
plotting how to elope with Philoclea by setting up her parents on a blind 
date with one another. Pyrocles is disguised as Cleophila the Amazon, 
9 See for example Miscellaneous Prose of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Katherine Duncan- Jones 
and Jan van Dorsten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 202, which reads the passage as de-
scribing the mental places consulted and the inventions retrieved from them, by a read-
erly art of memory.
10 A possible source or analogue for Sidney’s use of an artistic metaphor to describe 
an act of ethical self- improvement is Plotinus, Enneads, 1.6.9, where self- perfection on the 
analogy of the sculptor hewing and polishing is a precondition of seeing the ideas and 
ultimately God. For Sidney and Plotinus, see Kurt Spellmeyer, “Plotinus and Seventeenth- 
Century Literature: A Prolegomenon to Further Study,” Pacific Coast Philology 17 (1982): 
50–58 (esp. 50–52). For a possible site of Sidney’s encounter with Plotinus, his translation 
of Mornay’s Traité de la vérité de la religion chrestienne, see below, nn. 23 and 27.
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and so he is referred to by the narrator with feminine pronouns. The 
strategy of disguise, the narrator has previously told us, was “put in his 
head” by “love, the refiner of invention,”11 and here again Pyrocles is 
represented as a loving poet or artist:
With that with hasty hands she gat herself up, turning her sight to everything, 
as if change of object might help her invention. So went she again to the cave, 
where forthwith it came into her head that should be the fittest place to perform 
her exploit—of which she had now a kind of confused conceit, although she had 
not set down in her fancy the meeting with each particularity that might fall 
out. But as a painter doth at the first but show a rude proportion of the thing he 
imitates, which after with more curious hand he draws to the representing each 
lineament, so had her thoughts (beating about it continually) received into them 
a ground plot of her device, although she had not in each part shaped it accord-
ing to a full determination. (OA, 215)12
We can start to turn these metaphors around and ask whether this pas-
sage might have something to tell us about the process of artistic cre-
ation, whether Cleophila’s “kind of confused conceit” could furnish an 
explanatory gloss for the celebrated “idea or fore- conceit” created by the 
poet in the Defence (DP, 9).
Readers, then, can be like artists, we learn from the Defence: they may 
“use the narration but as an imaginative ground- plot of a profitable 
invention.” Lovers, too, can be like artists, that passage in the Arcadia 
shows us: their faculty of “invention” refined by love, they will devise 
a “conceit” or “ground plot” rather as a painter sketches an initial “pro-
portion.” And we can complete this triangle of metaphoric associations 
by noticing that readers can also be like lovers, according to a common-
place that Sidney borrows from Plato and Cicero and refers to several 
times. If we could see virtue, that commonplace tells us, we would fall in 
love with it, so beautiful would it be;13 and it is the making of virtue into 
11 The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The Old Arcadia), ed. Jean Robertson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), 12; all further references are to this edition and are given par-
enthetically in the text prefixed with “OA.” Cf. the revised version of this passage in The 
Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia (London, 1590), I2r; further quotations from this edition, 
which I quote in the Kent State University Press facsimile reproduction of 1970, are indi-
cated with the siglum 90; I expand abbreviations and regularize i/j and u/v in quotations 
from this source.
12 Cf. the version of this passage in the composite 1593 Arcadia: The Countess of Pem-
brokes Arcadia (London, 1593), 2H5r, ll. 8–18 (hereafter “93,” with abbreviations expanded 
and usage of i/j and u/v regularized in any quotations from this source).
13 DP, 29; and cf. 21, 24. The source is Plato, Phaedrus, 250d, followed in Cicero, De fini-
bus, 2.16.52 and De officiis, 1.5.14.
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something visible, an “image” or “picture” as Sidney calls it (DP, 12, 17, 
29, etc.), that is the job of the poet (“A perfect picture I say, for he yield-
eth to the powers of the mind an image of that whereof the philosopher 
bestoweth but a wordish description,” 16). This is how Pyrocles learns 
from Musidorus (“He taught me by word, and best by example, giving 
me in him so lively an Image of vertue, as ignorance could not cast such 
mist over mine eyes, as not to see, and to love it” [90, 2A5r]).14 And it is 
how Astrophil tries, and fails, to learn from Stella in sonnet 25 of Astro-
phil and Stella: Plato has said “That Vertue, if it once met with our eyes, / 
Strange flames of Love it in our soules would raise”; Virtue, “with ver-
tuous care to ster / Love of her selfe, takes Stella’s shape”; and now As-
trophil proves Plato’s saying true, “for I do burne in love” (AS 25.3–4, 
9–10, and 14).15
If we accept Sidney’s serious engagement with Platonism, then this 
chain of associations between loving, reading, and artistic creation is no 
surprise. We will continue to argue about the precise sources and color-
ing of Sidney’s particular Platonism, what combination of Mornay, Cas-
tiglione, Bembo, Ficino, St. Augustine, Plotinus, or any number of other 
writers who had engaged with Plato and the Platonic tradition, might 
have inflected Sidney’s own versions of Platonic theories, themes, and 
concepts.16 But there is good evidence that he read Plato, and in a fo-
cused way; and good reason to believe, therefore, that his Platonism 
comes above all from Plato. He refers in the Defence, not always by name, 
but directly enough, to the Symposium, Plato’s dialogue on love; to the 
Phaedrus, a dialogue on love and rhetoric that includes a key account of 
Plato’s theory of the forms; to the Republic, where the theory of forms is 
14 The text corresponds to The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The New Arcadia), ed. 
Victor Skretkowicz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 235; further references to this 
(modern- spelling) edition use the siglum NA.
15 See Bergvall, The “Enabling of Judgement,” for an excellent reading of this sonnet, teas-
ing out the different Platonisms with which it plays (97–99).
16 The working assumption in accounts of Sidney’s Platonism is that it derives from 
modern sources. On the tendency in accounts of Platonism in England to lump together 
the many different kinds of continental and classical Platonism, see Sears Jayne, “Ficino 
and the Platonism of the English Renaissance,” Comparative Literature 4 (1952): 214. Jayne 
argues that Sidney was one of the few Elizabethan writers to go back to Italian sources 
rather than just copying the diluted Petrarchan Platonism of the French sonneteers (233–
36). See also Bergvall, The “Enabling of Judgement,” esp. chap. 2, for Sidney’s kind of Pla-
tonism as a marked rejection of Florentine Platonism and far closer to Augustine. Berg-
vall also rightly draws attention to another strangely neglected source or analogue: the 
Augustininan Platonism informing the detailed analysis of texts and ideas in Mornay’s 
Traité de la vérité de la religion chrestienne, which Sidney translated (51–52).
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further worked out and used to denigrate artistic mimesis; to the Ion, 
Plato’s somewhat tongue- in- cheek dialogue about inspired rhapsodes, 
often used by the Neoplatonists to articulate a theory of artistic creation 
through divine inspiration; and to the Timaeus, with its creation myth 
in which the Demiurge patterns reality on the eternal Platonic forms.17 
We know that Sidney was sent, in 1579, a copy of the new three- volume 
edition of the complete works of Plato edited and printed in Geneva 
by his friend Henri Estienne; this was a parallel- text edition, with the 
Greek text in one column and a Latin translation by Jean de Serres in 
the other.18 So a reading of Plato might have occupied him at the time 
17 Symposium: DP, 5, 39; Phaedrus: DP, 5, 29, 39; Republic: DP, 5, 39; Ion: DP, 40; and 
Timaeus: DP, 5. Other dialogues are the sources for remarks and terms: Sophist for eika-
stikē and phantastikē (DP, 36); Theaetetus for the astronomer and the ditch (DP, 13); and 
Phaedo (perhaps via Plutarch) for Socrates versifying Aesop (DP, 41). Earlier studies of 
Sidney’s use of Plato include: Irene Samuel, “The Influence of Plato on Sir Philip Sidney’s 
Defence of Poesy,” Modern Language Quarterly 1 (1940): 383–91; F. Michael Krouse, “Plato 
and Sidney’s Defence of Poesie,” Comparative Literature 6 (1954): 138–47; John P. McIntyre, 
“Sidney’s ‘Golden World,’” Comparative Literature 14 (1962): 356–65; and Morriss Henry 
Partee, “Sir Philip Sidney and the Renaissance Knowledge of Plato,” English Studies 51 
(1970): 411–24. Much earlier debate had Sidney as either Platonic or Aristotelian, and 
that pattern continues in Heninger’s Sidney and Spenser: The Poet as Maker, where Sidney’s 
modern poetics is Aristotelian rather than Platonic (and Spenser is the benighted Neopla-
tonist), though he leaves space for Sidney’s syncretism (in one telling phrase talking of 
“the neo- Aristotelian poetics that Sidney meddles with platonist principles in the Defence” 
[383]). The most eloquent reconciliation remains that of John C. Ulreich, Jr., for whom the 
Defence is “a dynamic fusion of Aristotelian and Platonic impulses, not a mere amalgam of 
influences but a coherent argument” (“‘The Poets Only Deliver’: Sidney’s Conception of 
Mimesis,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 15 (1982): 67–84; reprinted in Essential Articles 
for the Study of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Arthur F. Kinney [Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1986], 
142). In this tradition, see also M. J. B. Allen, “Sidney’s Defence and the Image Making of 
Plato’s Sophist,” in Sir Philip Sidney’s Achievements, ed. M. J. B. Allen, Dominic Baker- Smith, 
and Arthur F. Kinney (New York: AMS Press, 1990), 93–108; and D. H. Craig, “A Hybrid 
Growth: Sidney’s Theory of Poetry in An Apology for Poetry,” English Literary Renaissance 
10 (1980): 183–201. Bergvall’s study is one of the most impressively generous accounts 
of the issues: “The synthesis of Plato and Aristotle was something [Sidney] shared with 
humanism in general and need not imply the rejection of one for the other” (The “Enabling 
of Judgement,” 59); “Sidney devised a poetics which was based on a mixture of Augus-
tinian Platonism and Aristotelianism, and which had a strong rhetorical bias. The Sid-
neian model posited a world of ideas beyond the written text and a communicative model 
by which these ideas could be transmitted to the reader” (122). But a literalism of sorts 
sets in when Bergvall imagines a Sidneian reading of Sidney, which is entirely circum-
scribed by (devoutly Protestant) Christian ethics.
18 Plato, Opera quae extant omnia, 3 vols. (Geneva, 1578). On Sidney’s use of this edition, 
see S. K. Heninger, Jr., “Sidney and Serranus’ Plato,” English Literary Renaissance 13 (1983): 
146–61. For the question of Sidney’s use of the Greek text, see Micha Lazarus, “Sidney’s 
Greek Poetics,” Studies in Philology 112 (2015): 504–36. Heninger usefully draws attention 
to the role of the paratextual features of Serranus’s Latin translation in shaping Sidney’s 
understanding of the dialogues.
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that he was formulating the Arcadia, and must have taken place before 
he wrote the Defence, Astrophil and Stella, and the revised Arcadia in the 
early 1580s. This interest in Plato bears its most obvious fruit in what 
Sidney says about poetic creation in the “golden world” passage in the 
Defence:
There is no art delivered to mankind that hath not the works of nature for his 
principal object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so de-
pend as they become actors and players, as it were, of what nature will have set 
forth. [. . .] Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up 
with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another nature, 
in making things either better than nature bringeth forth or, quite anew, forms 
such as never were in nature, as the heroes, demigods, cyclopes, chimeras, 
furies and such like. So as he goeth hand in hand with nature, not enclosed 
within the narrow warrant of her gifts but freely ranging only within the zodiac 
of his own wit. Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers 
poets have done, neither with so pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet- smelling 
flowers, nor whatsoever else may make the too- much- loved earth more lovely: 
her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden.
But let those things alone and go to man, for whom as the other things are, so 
it seemeth in him her uttermost cunning is employed, and know whether she 
have brought forth so true a lover as Theagenes, so constant a friend as Pylades, 
so valiant a man as Orlando, so right a prince as Xenophon’s Cyrus, so excellent 
a man every way as Virgil’s Aeneas. Neither let this be jestingly conceived, be-
cause the works of the one be essential, the other in imitation or fiction, for any 
understanding knoweth the skill of each artificer standeth in that idea or fore- 
conceit of the work, and not in the work itself. And that the poet hath that idea is 
manifest by delivering them forth in such excellency as he had imagined them; 
which delivering forth also is not wholly imaginative, as we are wont to say by 
them that build castles in the air, but so far substantially it worketh, not only to 
make a Cyrus, which had been but a particular excellency as nature might have 
done, but to bestow a Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyruses, if they will 
learn aright why and how that maker made him. (DP, 8–9)
For Plato, the ideas are eternal, immutable forms that exist on a higher 
plane of reality than the visible universe, which is a mere shadow of 
their substance. Our souls glimpse them between incarnations, and 
what we learn in our life is shaped by half- memories of the forms. Our 
ability to remember what we had glimpsed may be enhanced by the 
madness of poetic inspiration, but the surest route is love, which is re-
vealed to be not a mere physical itch but a recognition of a shadowy 
reflection of the idea or form of beauty in the beauty of the person we 
 Gavin Alexander 49
love.19 We may then move from this perceptible beauty to the idea of 
beauty, regaining that lost glimpse of the Platonic form itself and also 
sparing ourselves the messy business of physical love. As Castiglione 
formulates this:
in steade of goinge out of his witt with thought, as he must do that will consider 
the bodilye beawty, he may come into his witt, to behoulde the beawty that is 
seene with the eyes of the minde, which then beegin to be sharpe and thorough 
seeinge, whan the eyes of the body lose the floure of their sightlynesse.20
We can see Sidney on a similar track when he describes the Psalms as a 
kind of love poetry: “a heavenly poesy, wherein almost [the Psalmist] 
showeth himself a passionate lover of that unspeakable and everlasting 
beauty, to be seen by the eyes of the mind, only cleared by faith” (DP, 7).
As Plato famously argued in the Republic, art offers representations 
of the visible world, and that visible world is itself a set of copies of the 
ideas; and copies of copies are of little value. Platonic theory, though, 
does not depend on this apparent hostility to artistic representation, 
and a Neoplatonic modification to the theory of the relation of art to the 
ideas was offered by Cicero, Seneca, and Plotinus, and taken up with re-
newed vigor by Renaissance theorists of visual art especially but also of 
poetry. According to this modification, the artist represents not some-
thing in the world that is a mere copy of an idea but the idea itself.21 If 
we accept that the artist can apprehend the ideas and is not restricted 
only to copying their manifestations in the visible world, then the artist 
may improve on nature’s work or, as Plotinus puts it, “add where na-
19 See Phaedrus, 244b– 257b.
20 Baldassare Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier [trans. Thomas Hoby], ed. Virginia 
Cox (London: Everyman, 1994), 357.
21 See Cicero, Orator, 2.8–10; Plotinus, Enneads, 5.8.1; and Seneca, Epistulae morales, 65.7: 
“it is [the idea] that the artist gazed upon when he created the work which he had de-
cided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has his pattern outside himself, 
that he may direct his glance to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by him-
self.” For analogues within the traditions of Italian art criticism, Italian and French poetry 
and poetics, and Protestant theology, see also An Apology for Poetry, ed. Geoffrey Shep-
herd, 3rd ed. rev. R. W. Maslen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 140–41, 
and Walter R. Davis, Idea and Act in Elizabethan Fiction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1969), 35–37. For a useful survey of the various theses about the meaning and 
sources of Sidney’s “idea or fore- conceit” along with an account of the term’s genealogy, 
see chap. 3 of Michael Mack, Sidney’s Poetics, esp. 55–77. See also Robinson, The Shape of 
Things Known, 108–10; and for Augustinian analogues, see Bergvall, The “Enabling of Judge-
ment,” 37–39. There is always within this tradition an ambiguity as to whether the idea is 
just a fancy word for whatever the poet or artist projects or really does map on to the Pla-
tonic form itself. On this oscillation in the Renaissance, see Mack, Sidney’s Poetics, 57–59.
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ture is lacking”:22 Nature gives you Caesar; the poet gives you Aeneas, 
a better expression of the idea of a just and noble leader.
If we return to the central passage from the Defence, we can see the im-
portance of this theory of the idea. God forms the world on the pattern 
of the ideas; the poet can form a second world on the pattern of those 
ideas.23 We would then say that a character like Cyrus, to take Sidney’s 
favorite example, is not so much a complex person as an expression of 
an idea of virtue. If we learn from his example, then we become another 
representation or reification of that idea of virtue:
the skill of each artificer standeth in that idea or fore- conceit of the work, and 
not in the work itself. And that the poet hath that idea is manifest by delivering 
them forth in such excellency as he had imagined them; which delivering forth 
also is not wholly imaginative, as we are wont to say by them that build castles 
in the air, but so far substantially it worketh, not only to make a Cyrus, which 
had been but a particular excellency as nature might have done, but to bestow a 
Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyruses, if they will learn aright why and 
how that maker made him. (DP, 9)
We should pause over that last conditional clause. The skill of the poet 
“standeth in that idea or fore- conceit of the work, and not in the work 
itself”; and the skill of the reader consists in apprehending that idea. 
If the idea is properly conceived, delivered, and apprehended, the fic-
tional idea of Cyrus will “make many Cyruses” because readers will 
be moved to imitate what they have learned. But only, in that impor-
tant qualification, “if they will learn aright why and how that maker 
made him.” This is a rare example of Sidney thinking about reading as 
an active rather than a passive process: it implies some effort to appre-
hend and understand the idea.24 But Sidney does not elaborate on this 
process here or anywhere else in the Defence, and we are left rather tan-
talized. How does he think interpretation works; what is it to “learn 
22 Enneads, 5.8.1 in the translation of Stephen MacKenna: The Enneads, ed. John Dillon 
(London: Penguin, 1991), 411.
23 Sidney’s Platonic understanding of the process of divine creation finds contempo-
rary sources and analogues in Du Bartas, La sepmaine (on which, see Mack, Sidney’s Poet-
ics, 77–80) and Mornay’s De la vérité as translated by Sidney and/or Arthur Golding: “For, 
as the Craftesman maketh his worke by the patterne which he had erst conceyued in his 
mynde, which patterne is his inward word: so God made the World and all that is therein, 
by that sayd Speech of his as by his inward skill or arte” (A woorke concerning the trewnesse 
of the Christian religion . . . begunne to be translated into English by Sir Philip Sidney Knight, 
and at his request finished by Arthur Golding [London, 1587], 60; hereafter “Trewnesse”).
24 For a similar point made about this key phrase, see Bergvall, The “Enabling of Judge-
ment,” 39–41: “Sidney advocates process rather than product” (39–40).
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aright”; and how can fiction really transform our behavior? How does 
the mechanism of the readerly apprehension and imitation of the idea 
function? The answer that I want to offer is that, for Sidney, it functions 
like love, but this is no simple answer.25
* * *
Sidney might have encountered something like a theory of loving read-
ing in Augustine’s De doctrina Christiana.26 Augustine was profoundly 
influenced by both Plato and Plotinus, and there is a recognizably Pla-
tonic shape to his account of a progress of readerly skill up a kind of 
hermeneutic ladder or staircase, discovering “meanings that are won 
only with difficulty” to God and to wisdom.27 The association between 
Platonic love and hermeneutic skill is one of the most important fields 
of metaphorical play in Astrophil and Stella. Astrophil struggles with 
the theory of Platonic love: he knows that he is supposed to move from 
desiring Stella to something more spiritual and intellectual, but he just 
cannot manage it. And it is often in metaphors of reading that Astrophil 
describes his failure. He is too addicted to looking at Stella and can only 
manage any patience when in her presence, “When I might reade those 
25 The only argument about Sidneian poetics I have encountered that resembles mine 
here is Walter R. Davis’s in Idea and Act, where he observes in a brief but telling paragraph 
that “Poetry is . . . like love in its being and operation. It exists, like love, as intermediary 
between the concretely actual and the Idea; it acts, like love, to draw men from the actual 
to the Idea. It is, in short, the mediator of two worlds” (41).
26 De doctrina remains an under- exploited source in work on the Defence, with Berg-
vall the only significant exception (see also his essay on Sidney in The Oxford Guide to the 
Historical Reception of Augustine, ed. Karla Pollman, 3 vols. [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013], 3:1737–39). Heninger makes good use of De civitate Dei in Sidney and Spenser 
(182–96), though that is an outline of Augustinian aesthetics rather than hermeneutics. 
For useful background in an excellent account of John Donne’s engagement with Augus-
tinian hermeneutics, see Katrin Ettenhuber’s Donne’s Augustine: Renaissance Cultures of 
Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 15–21. Also worth consider-
ing as a source is the straightforward analogy investigated by Plotinus between divinely 
wrought beauty (which might prompt love) and the beauty of the humanly wrought art-
work (Enneads, 5.8.1–2).
27 DDC, book 2, 7.9.16–17.11.23. Augustine posits seven stages (or steps: his word is 
gradus): fear of God; holiness (and attendant teachableness); knowledge; fortitude; com-
passion; a sixth stage, “in which he now purifies the eye [oculum purgat] by which God 
may actually be seen” and, again, “purifies the eye of his heart [purgat oculum cordis]” 
(DDC, book 2, 7.11.22–23); and finally wisdom. Sidney appears to glance at the sixth stage 
when he talks of “that unspeakable and everlasting beauty, to be seen by the eyes of the 
mind, only cleared by faith” (DP, 7), though cf. also Trewnesse, 7 and Plotinus, Enneads, 
1.6.9. For further Augustinian usages, see Bergvall, The “Enabling of Judgement,” 24–25. Cf. 
also Trewnesse on the rational “myndsight” (55), “insight of Mynd” (85, quoting Plotinus), 
or “cleeresighted” wit (325) that apprehends God.
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letters faire of blisse, / Which in her face teach vertue” (AS 56.5–6). He 
fears that his “Hope” is misinterpreting her behavior:
Her eye’s- speech is translated thus by thee:
 But failst thou not in phrase so heav’nly hie?
 Looke on againe, the faire text better trie:
What blushing notes doest thou in margine see?
(AS 67.5–8)28
Astrophil’s failures as a lover are represented as his failures as a reader. 
For us as readers, for whom Stella is a text not only metaphorically but 
also actually, the effect is to align Astrophil’s loving of Stella with our 
reading of Sidney’s poem. We can interpret Sidney’s characters and the 
larger text of Astrophil and Stella, and this will be an activity similar (and 
similarly challenging) to Astrophil’s as a Platonic lover. Two poems in 
particular set out this analogy. The less well- known is the seventh song, 
one of a pair in which Astrophil writes about Stella singing and about 
how his sight is captivated by her physical beauty, his hearing by her 
beautiful voice:
Whose senses in so evill consort, their stepdame Nature laies,
That ravishing delight in them most sweete tunes do not raise;
Or if they do delight therein, yet are so cloyed with wit,
As with sententious lips to set a title vaine on it:
O let them heare these sacred tunes, and learne in wonder’s schooles,
To be (in things past bounds of wit) fooles, if they be not fooles.
Who have so leaden eyes, as not to see sweet beautie’s show,
Or seeing, have so wodden wits, as not that worth to know;
Or knowing, have so muddy minds, as not to be in love;
Or loving, have so frothy thoughts, as easly thence to move:
O let them see these heavenly beames, and in faire letters reede
A lesson fit, both sight and skill, love and firme love to breede.
Heare then, but then with wonder heare; see but adoring see,
No mortall gifts, no earthly fruites, now here descended be:
See, do you see this face? a face? nay image of the skies,
Of which the two life- giving lights are figured in her eyes:
Heare you this soule- invading voice, and count it but a voice?
The very essence of their tunes, when Angels do rejoyce.
28 Cf. Petrarch for a precedent: “bit by bit within her lovely eyes I read whatever I say 
of Love and whatever I write” (Canzoniere, 151.13–14, in Petrarch’s Lyric Poems, ed. and 
trans. Robert M. Durling [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976]).
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As so often, Astrophil may just be talking to himself, telling himself 
to stop lusting after Stella and react with something more like spiri-
tual wonder. But he does seem to be imagining other reactions (in the 
first stanza, those who hear a song and have to offer a sententious judg-
ment on it); he may, in fact, be talking to us and guiding our response 
to Stella. The previous poem, Song vi, had begun “O you that heare this 
voice, / O you that see this face,” requiring us either to step back and 
merely overhear a conversation in which we are not included or to step 
forward and make the leap from being told about something to imagin-
ing we can see and hear it, thereby making the poem an address to its 
readers. This, in fact, is the effort Sidney’s poetics requires: the theory 
of the “speaking picture” is built on the notion that words can put an 
image before the mind’s eye that—as far as the mind is concerned—is 
no less real than the reports of actualities presented to it by the senses.29 
But we, as imaginative readers, always know that we have taken that 
step, that we are going along with the poet in imagining that we can see 
what he tells us he sees. So when we are told in the seventh song that 
Stella is an image of the skies, figuring sun and moon in her eyes, we 
are, necessarily, deliberately, reminded that the Stella we see is already 
an image—a speaking picture created by words, in figures. To put that 
in explicitly Platonic terms, she is not a shadow of an idea—an image 
of heavenly perfection—but rather a verbal image of the idea that an 
idea might be shadowed forth. Against this tendency to lose Stella in 
the poetic play of Platonic shadows and mirrors, Sidney sets the driv-
ing logic of the second stanza, employing the rhetorical figure known as 
climax (the Greek word, meaning “ladder”) or gradatio (the Latin term, 
meaning “staircase”) to push us up the Platonic ladder of love from see-
ing to recognizing to loving to learning.30 This movement toward the 
apprehension of the idea that Stella figures is likened to reading—“O let 
them see these heavenly beames, and in faire letters reede / A lesson fit, 
both sight and skill, love and firme love to breede.” Looking is like read-
29 For more on Sidney’s visual poetics and epistemology, see Robinson, The Shape of 
Things Known; and my “Seeing through Words in Theories of Poetry: Sidney, Puttenham, 
Lodge,” in A Companion to Tudor Literature, ed. Kent Cartwright (Chichester: Blackwell, 
2010), 350–63.
30 Perhaps it is no coincidence that this is one of the figures Augustine dwells most 
on in De doctrina: see DDC, book 4, 7.11.32 (“Yet we recognize here the figure generally 
designated by the Greek word ‘climax’—though some people, not wishing to speak of 
a ‘ladder,’ prefer the Latin word gradatio—whereby words or ideas are linked one with 
another”). Cf. Augustine’s use of gradus for the steps of Christian reading, n. 27 above.
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ing, then; but we are not looking, we are reading, and any sight is either 
merely metaphorical or at most a matter of the mind’s eye activated by 
the verbal image. Notice how overwrought Astrophil sounds as he tries 
not only to tell us we can see something but to tell us that the something 
we cannot see but should imagine we can see is not actually what it ap-
pears to be but something else altogether: “See, do you see this face? a 
face? nay image of the skies.”
This poem problematizes the act of reading. It draws attention to the 
effort the reader has to make in order to move beyond the surface of 
the text to some imaginative apprehension of what lies behind it. But 
the poem also represents successful reading and interpretation as intu-
itive and amorous: we should not offer sententious commentary and 
interpretation; rather, we should be struck dumb with wonder, leave 
reason behind, and be (if we are not foolish) like fools; if we are not 
leaden, wooden, muddy, or frothy, we should love what we see and stay 
there, not move easily thence, be firm in love, both see and know (“skill” 
means knowledge).31
Sidney’s more famous take on the analogy between loving and read-
ing is sonnet 71:
Who will in fairest booke of Nature know,
 How Vertue may best lodg’d in beautie be,
 Let him but learne of Love to reade in thee,
Stella, those faire lines, which true goodnesse show.
There shall he find all vices’ overthrow,
 Not by rude force, but sweetest soveraigntie
 Of reason, from whose light those night- birds flie;
That inward sunne in thine eyes shineth so.
 And not content to be Perfection’s heire
Thy selfe, doest strive all minds that way to move,
Who marke in thee what is in thee most faire.
So while thy beautie drawes the heart to love,
 As fast thy Vertue bends that love to good:
 “But ah,” Desire still cries, “give me some food.”
The loving reader may love the beautiful image of the idea of virtue 
and read a lesson of goodness in its “faire lines”; or desire may drag 
that reader back down to earth, as it does Astrophil. Astrophil’s failure 
as a lover is explicitly a failure as a reader, a reader who is unable, in 
the terms of Sidney’s Defence, to “learn aright why and how that maker 
31 Cf. the possibly Sidneian “tree of the skill of good and euill,” in Trewnesse, 495.
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made” the image in question (DP, 9). God makes the “booke of Nature,” 
and the Sidneian poet makes, in a book, the “second nature” (DP, 9), 
which in this case can include the image of nature as a book that can be 
correctly read by the reader prepared to “learne of Love.” We are aligned 
with Astrophil, and we are implicitly told that we are likely, as readers, 
to fall short.
Astrophil starts his sequence confidently imagining a straightfor-
ward hermeneutic ladder (and notice, as Abraham Fraunce did, the 
textbook use of climax or gradatio here):32
Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to show,
That the deare She might take some pleasure of my paine:
Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know,
Knowledge might pitie winne, and pitie grace obtaine[.]
(AS 1.1–4)
The loving artist will make poetry that will (in the terms of Sidney’s 
rhetorical poetics) delight, teach, and move the reader (Stella) to recip-
rocate his love. But Astrophil gets stuck trying to write effectively or 
pays too much attention to the prospect of being read by other readers 
than Stella (AS 28, AS 34, and AS 74.11). On the rare occasions when his 
words are read by Stella, they misfire, failing to delight, teach, or move 
her and instead affecting him:
        in piercing phrases late,
 Th’anatomy of all my woes I wrate,
Stella’s sweete breath the same to me did reed.
 O voice, ô face, maugre my speeche’s might,
 Which wooed wo, most ravishing delight
Even those sad words even in sad me did breed.
(AS 58.9–14)
There is no thought there of what those words might mean to Stella. 
Once, in Astrophil and Stella 45, Astrophil tries to think about Stella 
reading him figuratively, as he so often reads her:
Stella oft sees the verie face of wo
 Painted in my beclowded stormie face:
 But cannot skill to pitie my disgrace,
Not though thereof the cause her selfe she know:
Yet hearing late a fable, which did show
 Of Lovers never knowne, a grievous case,
32 Fraunce, The Arcadian Rhetorike (London, [1588]), C8r.
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 Pitie thereof gate in her breast such place
That, from that sea deriv’d, teares’ spring did flow.
 Alas, if Fancy drawne by imag’d things,
Though false, yet with free scope more grace doth breed
Then servant’s wracke, where new doubts honor brings;
Then thinke my deare, that you in me do reed
 Of Lover’s ruine some sad Tragedie:
 I am not I, pitie the tale of me.
Astrophil is lost in that very Sidneian space between being metaphori-
cally written and read and being a text in actuality. The potential of 
metaphors to tell us about actualities (for love to tell us about reading, 
or for reading to tell us about love) is both offered and undermined in 
Astrophil and Stella by the sequence’s exhilarating games between the 
poles of the literal and figurative. Astrophil writes, reads, and is writ-
ten, both literally and figuratively: he is poet, reader, and text; but he is 
also at times like a poet, like a reader, like a text. Stella, similarly, sings, 
reads, and is read, and is also like a figure who sings, or reads, or is read. 
In sonnet 45, it is her competence as a reader of fictions that appears to 
Astrophil to render her deaf to the fact of his love; loving and reading 
are disjoined.
* * *
If Astrophil and Stella is concerned with representing hermeneutic and 
amorous failure (in terms of each other), the Arcadia dares to imagine 
successful love and successful reading and successful love as success-
ful reading. But this does not mean that Sidney will not test and ques-
tion his models along the way. Argalus and Parthenia are the revised 
Arcadia’s most idealized lovers.33 In Sidney’s most focused depiction of 
the two lovers, we are again made to think about reading. Basilius has 
sent for Argalus to come and fight his rogue nephew Amphialus, who 
is holding the princesses and Pyrocles (still disguised as an Amazon, 
named in the revised version not Cleophila but Zelmane) hostage in 
his castle:
The messenger made speede, and found Argalus at a castle of his owne, sitting 
in a parler with the faire Parthenia, he reading in a booke the stories of Hercules, 
she by him, as to heare him reade; but while his eyes looked on the booke, she 
33 We might note in passing that Parthenia comes from Mantinea, like Socrates’s 
Diotima (Symposium, 201d– 212c), and so, associatively, might have some things to teach 
us about Platonic love.
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looked on his eies, and sometimes staying him with some prety question, not 
so much to be resolved of the doubte; as to give him occasion to looke upon 
her. A happy couple, he joying in her, she joying in her selfe, but in her selfe, be-
cause she enjoyed him: both encreasing their riches by giving to each other; each 
making one life double, because they made a double life one, where desire never 
wanted satisfaction, nor satisfaction never bred sacietie; he ruling, because she 
would obey: or rather because she would obey, she therein ruling. (90, 2P2v– 3r 
[punctuation silently adjusted in one place]; NA, 371–72)
But the reading sours when Argalus is handed the letter from Basilius 
summoning him to challenge Amphialus in single combat, and Par-
thenia must now watch him read it and interpret its meaning in his face:
And wel she found there was some serious matter; for her husbands counte-
nance figured some resolution betweene lothnesse and necessitie: and once his 
eie cast upon her, and finding hers upon him, he blushed; and she blushed, be-
cause he blushed; and yet streight grew paler, because she knew not why he 
had blushed. (90, 2P3r; NA, 372)
Argalus goes to fight Amphialus and is killed. Parthenia follows him, 
disguising herself as the Knight of the Tomb and meeting the same fate 
at the same hand. The reflective images of perfect mutual love in that 
earlier passage are picked up in their epitaph (a text Sidney may not 
have written):34
   The Epitaph.
His being was in her alone:
And he not being, she was none.
 They joi’d one joy, one griefe they griev’d,
 One love they lov’d, one life they liv’d.
 The hand was one, one was the sword
 That did his death, hir death afford.
As all the rest, so now the stone
That tombes the two, is justly one.
   ARGALUS AND PARTHENIA.
(93, 2C1r; NA, 399–400; OP 3)
One thing that these passages suggest is that Sidney is here quietly chal-
lenging his own theories. Argalus throws away his life in a pointless 
duel, and he is perhaps encouraged to this praxis by his reading of the 
34 See my Writing After Sidney: The Literary Response to Sir Philip Sidney, 1586–1640 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 26–27.
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tales of Hercules.35 But what I want to draw out of this episode in par-
ticular is the tension between the symmetry of the two lovers—“each 
making one life double, because they made a double life one”; “One love 
they lov’d, one life they liv’d”—and a more hierarchical relation—“he joy-
ing in her, she joying in her selfe, but in her selfe, because she enjoyed 
him”; “he ruling, because she would obey: or rather because she would 
obey, she therein ruling.” The hierarchy is one of dependence: Argalus 
reads the book, Parthenia reads Argalus.
That hierarchy is fundamental to the Platonic theory of love in its 
original form. We should remember (in spite of Neoplatonism’s ten-
dency to adapt the theory in a heterosexual and Christian direction) 
that Plato’s is in its purest form a theory of homosexual love and that 
this love is not between two equal lovers but between a lover and a be-
loved, a senior and a junior partner. The lover falls for the beloved be-
cause he sees something in the beloved that stirs a recollection of the 
idea of beauty. The lover, in contemplating the beloved and beginning 
to climb the ladder of love, shapes within himself an image of the be-
loved that is to an extent idealized, improved, closer to the idea than 
to the actuality.36 The beloved sees this image and cannot but fall for 
it, and so the love is returned. Just as Argalus reads the book and Par-
thenia reads Argalus, so the Platonic lover contemplates the ideas and 
the beloved contemplates the lover. Ficino elaborates the basic Platonic 
material usefully: “the lover engraves the figure of the beloved on his 
own soul. And so the soul of the lover becomes a mirror in which the 
image of the beloved is reflected. For that reason, when the beloved rec-
ognizes himself in the lover, he is forced to love him.”37 We find Spenser 
picking up the image of the mirror in sonnet 45 of Amoretti:
Leaue lady in your glasse of christall clene,
 Your goodly selfe for euermore to vew:
 and in my selfe, my inward selfe I meane,
 most liuely lyke behold your semblant trew.
Within my hart, though hardly it can shew
35 On readerly praxis, see DP, 22, discussed further below, 63.
36 Plato, Phaedrus, 251a– 251e. Cf. Edmund Spenser, “An Hymne in Honour of Beautie,” 
211–38, in The Shorter Poems, ed. Richard A. McCabe (London: Penguin, 1999); further 
quotations from Spenser’s shorter poems are from the texts of this edition. For the ladder, 
see Symposium, 211c.
37 Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plato’s “Symposium” on Love, trans. Sears Jayne 
(Woodstock, CT: Spring Publications, 1985), 57. Cf. Phaedrus, 255d: “[The beloved] does 
not realize that he is seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror” (Plato, Complete Works, ed. 
John M. Cooper [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997]).
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 thing so diuine to vew of earthly eye:
 the fayre Idea of your celestiall hew,
 and euery part remaines immortally[.]
This is a conventional take on a commonplace: Spenser is not about to 
question the hierarchy of male Neoplatonic lover leading female be-
loved in a sonnet sequence that is, in part at least, a self- serving account 
of his own domestic life. As an alternative to this hierarchical model of 
love, the classical philosophy of friendship offers a more symmetrical 
and mutual model, as Montaigne recognizes with an explicit compari-
son of the Platonic model and the “kind of love more equable and more 
equitable” in his essay “On affectionate relationships.”38 We perhaps see 
a hint of this wish for something more symmetrical in Spenser’s take on 
Platonic love in “An Hymne in Honour of Beautie,” for here there are 
two mirrors facing each other:
But gentle Loue, that loiall is and trew,
Will more illumine your resplendent ray,
And adde more brightnesse to your goodly hew,
From light of his pure fire, which by like way
Kindled of yours, your likenesse doth display,
Like as two mirrours by opposd reflexion,
Doe both expresse the faces first impression.
(176–82)
Sidney reaches toward a more symmetrical version of Platonic love in 
his depiction of the lovers in whom his narrative is most interested—
Pyrocles and Philoclea. And it is here, too, that his thinking about love 
and his thinking about reading and writing come together most pro-
ductively.
It was common to apply the term “idea” to the beloved, especially as 
idealized and perhaps even created by the poet- lover.39 Just so, in one 
of their poetic exchanges, Musidorus is told by Pyrocles that he “may to 
the saint, your onely Idea, . . . your manly affection utter” (OA 13.15–16). 
That is, in fact, Sidney’s only other use of the word apart from the two 
consecutive uses in the Defence. The beloved as idea is both object of 
love and subject of verse. This dynamic connection between the ideal-
38 Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 
1991), 211.
39 The Oxford English Dictionary witnesses a range of meanings of “idea” in the period, 
from the orthodox Platonic to much looser but nevertheless Plato- derived senses includ-
ing image, something in the mind (looking forward to Locke), likeness, plan, perfect ex-
ample, and ideal.
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izing that is love and the idealizing that is artistic creation is figured for 
Renaissance writers in the myth of Pygmalion, allegorized into a para-
digm of the idealizing male imagination. The sculptor creates a repre-
sentation of an idea of beauty, falls in love with it and, through Venus’s 
intercession in bringing the sculpture to life, has that love reciprocated. 
The myth equates loving both with idealized artistic creation and with 
the response to the finished work of art.
It is interesting to note that the first of those associations, which I am 
suggesting is latent in Sidneian poetics (and practice), is drawn out in 
William Scott’s The Model of Poesy, a work of poetics profoundly en-
gaged in the job of explicating Sidney’s theory and reconciling it with 
his practice:
[T]he poet proceeds after this manner. First, in his reasonable consideration 
whilst he ruminates on the true loveliness of virtue, he seems to frame to him-
self an image of her, which his own work, as the heathens feign of Pygmalion, 
he grows enamoured of; from thenceforth he becomes her herald and trum-
peter, to blazon her, to summon the world to serve under her colours. Hereto 
comes it that Sir Philip Sidney saith David showed himself, in his divine spirit 
of poesy, a passionate lover of that unspeakable everlasting beauty, to be seen 
by the eyes of the mind, cleared only by faith. [. . .] Now as this love and liking 
cometh always of some likeness, so the perfecter the degree of this liking is, the 
nearer still it is joined to his object, restlessly labouring and striving forward till 
it be entirely united and even oned with the thing it affecteth. [. . .] And I would 
to God this might be the scope and end of the ends of all both poetry and other 
faculties, to make men in love with, and so possessed of, piety and virtue. Then 
might our art justly be called a divine instrument.40
Scott turns naturally from the loving artist to the loving reader. Pyg-
malion could also figure the latter, as we shall see, and so often func-
tions as a sign of the interchange and interface between writing and 
reading, between creation and reception, and the role of love in bring-
ing each into productive contact with the other. Love is frequently rep-
resented by Sidney in terms of reading and writing and of the paint-
ing and viewing of images. As we started to see in Astrophil and Stella, 
there is some surplus in these metaphors, because the loves described 
in terms of reading and writing are already read and written and that 
surplus is the space where our concerns as readers can enter into the 
equation.
The connection between love and writing is also made in the most 
40 Scott, The Model of Poesy, ed. Gavin Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 15–16.
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mundane ways. Love makes the doting Basilius a poet (OA, 97.3–7; NA, 
125.21–25). Musidorus accuses Pyrocles of reading too much poetry 
and taking on the rhetoric of “these fantastical mind- infected people 
that children and musicians call lovers,” to which Pyrocles can only 
answer: “what if I be not so much the poet . . . as even that very miser-
able subject of his cunning whereof you speak?” (OA, 17; NA, 52–53). 
It is “love, the refiner of invention” (OA, 12; NA, 80) that enables Pyro-
cles to play the poet with himself and turn into an Amazon, and, as we 
have already seen, his attempts to plot a happy resolution are described 
in the terms of literary and rhetorical theory, of “invention” (e.g. OA, 
113.32, 206.34) and its synonyms.
Musidorus reaches for a more Platonic theory of love early in the 
Arcadia in order to castigate Pyrocles:
For, indeed, the true love hath that excellent nature in it, that it doth transform 
the very essence of the lover into the thing loved, uniting and, as it were, incor-
porating it with a secret and inward working. And herein do these kinds of love 
imitate the excellent; for, as the love of heaven makes one heavenly, the love of 
virtue, virtuous, so doth the love of the world make one become worldly. And 
this effeminate love of a woman doth so womanize a man that, if you yield to it, 
it will not only make you a famous Amazon, but a launder, a distaff- spinner, or 
whatsoever other vile occupation their idle heads can imagine and their weak 
hands perform. (OA, 20; NA, 71–72)41
That the love of virtue can lead to virtue—that one can fall in love with 
an idea and make one’s life an imitation of it—is, as we have seen, key 
for Sidney’s literary theory: readers who will “despise the austere ad-
monitions of the philosopher” can be led by the poet “to see the form of 
goodness (which seen they cannot but love) ere themselves be aware” 
(DP, 24). And that love transforms the lover into the thing loved re-
mains the model to which Sidney’s lovers aspire: “As for my name, it 
shall be Cleophila, turning Philoclea to myself, as my mind is wholly 
turned and transformed into her” (OA, 18). When Pamela recognizes 
Musidorus’s love for her, she finds “the lively image of a vehement 
desire in herself” (OA, 106), a sort of artistic copy of the idea of Musi-
dorus’s love. Between friends, too, love can work as poetry does in the 
Defence. Pyrocles, we remember, recounts how Musidorus “taught me 
by word, and best by example, giving me in him so lively an Image of 
vertue, as ignorance could not cast such mist over mine eyes, as not to 
41 Scott quotes these words of Musidorus in the passage from which I give extracts 
above: see Scott, Model, 16.9–11.
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see, and to love it” (90, 2A5r; NA, 235). The mutual sympathy of the two 
loving princes means that each can find in the other “a sweet reflection 
of the same joy, and (as in a clear mirror of sincere goodwill) see a lively 
picture of his own gladness” (OA, 168). What this model becomes, in 
the case of Sidney’s favorite lovers Pyrocles and Philoclea, is a sort of 
artistic and hermeneutic exchange between two lovers, where each both 
writes and reads the other.
Pyrocles falls in love with an idea not a real woman—the idea figured 
forth in a picture of Philoclea with her parents.42 When this picture is 
described in the revised Arcadia it is set among various pictures of god-
desses and mythical women, “but in none of them all beautie seemed 
to speake so much” (90, C2r; NA, 15) as in Philoclea’s: Philoclea’s por-
trait is a “speaking picture” (DP, 10) of an idea of beauty. The picture 
is “made by Philoclea” (90, C2v; NA, 15), that is, a representation of her 
but also possibly designed by her: she has generated the “idea or fore- 
conceit” (DP, 9), which includes in this case the idea of her own beauty. 
As yet unloved and unloving, she is her own artist. When Pyrocles (dis-
guised as Cleophila and gendered as female) sees the real woman Philo-
clea and not just her image, s/he is transfixed, transformed into “a well 
wrought image, with show of life, but without all exercise of life, so 
forcibly had love transferred all her spirits into the present contempla-
tion of the lovely Philoclea” (OA, 38; cf. NA, 84). When, in book 2, Cleo-
phila/Pyrocles finally gets a chance to tell Philoclea who s/he is, what s/
he promises is that “You shall see . . . a living image and a present story 
of the best pattern love hath ever showed of his workmanship” (OA, 
120; cf. NA, 231). At this point Pyrocles is the lover written by love, but 
because that love is wrought by Philoclea, it is she who is next repre-
sented as the artist, as the female Cleophila metamorphoses before her 
eyes into the male Pyrocles (Sidney puns beautifully on “wax”): “The 
joy which wrought into Pygmalion’s mind while he found his beloved 
image wax little and little both softer and warmer in his folded arms, 
till at length it accomplished his gladness with a perfect woman’s shape, 
still beautified with the former perfections, was even such as, by each 
degree of Cleophila’s words, stealingly entered into Philoclea’s soul” 
(OA, 120; NA, 231).43 Sidney aligns Philoclea’s mind with that of the 
archetypal (male) loving artist, Pygmalion.
42 The picture is described in OA, 11.25–31 and differently in NA, 15.10–20.
43 Cf. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 10.284–85 for the moment the ivory of the statue starts to 
become warm and soft like wax.
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The association of the love of Pyrocles and Philoclea with idealiz-
ing interpretation and a mutually idealizing artistry is reinforced in the 
revised Arcadia and in one scene in particular. The narrator turns to 
 Philoclea:
And alas (sweete Philoclea) how hath my penne till now forgot thy passions, 
since to thy memorie principally all this long matter is intended? [. . .] The 
sweete minded Philoclea was in their degree of well doing, to whom the not 
knowing of evill serveth for a ground of vertue, and hold their inward powers 
in better forme with an unspotted simplicitie, then many, who rather cunningly 
seeke to know what goodnes is, then willingly take into themselves the follow-
ing of it. (90, Q3r; NA, 143)44
We notice the specific vocabulary of Sidney’s literary theory again. 
The “ground” of “well doing,” according to the Defence, ought to be the 
moral knowledge and the motive force that poetry can provide. All arts 
and sciences, Sidney tells us, are directed to “the mistress- knowledge, 
by the Greeks called architektonikē, which stands as I think in the knowl-
edge of a man’s self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end 
of well- doing and not of well- knowing only” (DP, 13). But in moving 
us to do as it teaches, Sidney goes on, poetry has the advantage: “For, 
as Aristotle saith, it is not gnōsis but praxis must be the fruit; and how 
praxis can be, without being moved to practise, it is no hard matter to 
consider” (DP, 22). Because Philoclea is untutored, she is less able to 
understand her feelings toward the Amazon Zelmane, and it is the de-
velopment of those feelings that Sidney goes on to describe as a sort of 
act of reading, interpretation, and imitative praxis:
For after that Zelmane had a while lived in the lodge with her, and that her onely 
being a noble straunger had bred a kind of heedfull attention; her comming to 
that lonely place . . . a willingnes of conversation; her wit and behaviour, a liking 
and silent admiration; at length the excellency of her natural gifts, joined with 
the extreme shewes she made of most devout honouring Philoclea . . . brought 
forth in her hart a yeelding to a most friendly affection; which when it had got-
ten so ful possession of the keies of her mind, that it would receave no message 
from her senses, without that affection were the interpreter; then streight grew 
an exceeding delight stil to be with her, with an unmeasurable liking of al that 
Zelmane did: maters being so turned in her, that where at first, liking her man-
ners did breed good- wil, now good- wil became the chiefe cause of liking her 
manners: so that within a while Zelmane was not prized for her demeanure, but 
the demeanure was prized because it was Zelmanes. (90, Q3v; NA, 144)
44 For this passage, see also OA, 108.20–28; all the rest is new to the revised Arcadia.
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We are here at the first stage of the affective triad (delight, teach, move), 
as Sidney configures it in the Defence. Philoclea is delighted and so is 
predisposed to learn and be moved to praxis. What follows is loud with 
the language of Sidney’s literary theory. I excerpt from a long passage:
Then followed that most natural effect of conforming ones self to that, which 
she did like, and not onely wishing to be her selfe such an other in all thinges, 
but to ground an imitation upon so much an esteemed authoritie: so that the 
next degree was to marke all Zelmanes dooings, speeches, and fashions, and to 
take them into herselfe, as a patterne of worthy proceeding . . . Then grew on 
that not onely she did imitate the sobernes of her countenance, the graceful-
nesse of her speech, but even their particular gestures: so that as Zelmane did 
often eye her, she would often eye Zelmane; and as Zelmanes eyes would deliver 
a submissive, but vehement desire in their looke, she, though as yet she had not 
the desire in her, yet should her eyes answere in like pearcing kindnesse of a 
looke . . . til at the last (poore soule, ere she were aware) she accepted not onely 
the band [93: “badge”], but the service; not only the signe, but the passion sig-
nified . . . Then needed she no more paint her face with passions; for passions 
shone thorow her face[.] (90, Q3v– 5r; NA, 144–46)
Pyrocles’s love for Philoclea creates Philoclea’s love as a mirror image 
of it through a process of imitation that is close to the theory both of 
writerly imitatio and of Sidney’s readerly praxis. Philoclea wishes to be 
like what she loves, and in the end this involves a surrender to it—she 
can choose to be written by Zelmane.45
There is nowhere else in Sidney such a careful depiction of how read-
ing works, and yet this extraordinary passage is on the face of it a de-
scription of falling in love. The use of the language of Sidneian poetics 
to describe love in the Arcadia encourages us, I think, to view the con-
nection from the other side too, to think about what Sidney’s depictions 
of love can tell us about his poetics and his hermeneutics. Artistic cre-
ation involves perceiving and refining an idea; so does love. The poet 
figures the idea forth in his fiction; the lover does the same in the image 
45 Cf. the very end of Sir William Alexander’s bridging passage, printed c. 1617 to link 
the unfinished “new” Arcadia to the ending supplied from the last three books of the “old.” 
Alexander, himself a loving imitative reader of Sidney, seems to recognize the potential 
of Sidney’s vocabulary of amorous and readerly mimesis to figure his role as Sidney’s 
reader at the very moment that his reading of Sidney comes to an end: “Philoclea, chained 
by thoughts to Zelmane, did imitate her being pensive, because shee was pensive: yet like 
a cunning Painter, who, having fully fed his eyes with the affected object, turnes backe 
within himselfe, that his imagination may engrave it the more exactly within his memory, 
she would sometimes with a theevishly adventrous looke spie Zelmanes gesture, that she 
might the better counterfeit it in her countenance” (Alexander’s untitled “Supplement” 
[STC 22544a.3 (1617?)], *6r; u/v regularized).
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of the beloved in his or her heart. The reader is presented with the idea 
in human form and is, Sidney hopes, captivated by it, delighted, taught, 
and moved to model him- or herself on it. That reader may just try to 
be like the image of virtue represented by the poet; or, if the reader 
can “learn aright why and how that maker made him” (DP, 9), then the 
reader may be apprehending and imitating the idea itself. Similarly, the 
beloved sees in the lover something that he or she falls in love with, 
without necessarily knowing exactly what it is: without knowing that 
it is the image of the beloved, refined and elevated in the lover’s heart 
through contemplating the idea of beauty that the lover has been led 
to. The lover idealizes the beloved, and the beloved responds to that 
idealization with love. We might imagine a more symmetrical version 
of this model, whereby two lovers each both read and write each other, 
idealizing the other and responding to the other’s idealization in a sort 
of positive feedback loop. That is what Sidney moves toward in the re-
vised Arcadia, where Pyrocles and Philoclea alternate between lover and 
beloved, writer and reader. We might remember that when Zelmane is 
finally revealed as Pyrocles, it is Philoclea who is presented as Pyg-
malion, the artist whose representation of an idea came to life. And so 
we might also imagine a more symmetrical version of Sidney’s account 
of literary interpretation. As a reader I respond to something—call it 
the text, or the author—that offers me a better version of myself. But I 
also have to do some of the work, and the job of learning “aright why 
and how” the author wrote as he or she wrote involves me in an ideal-
izing of motive and intention—I read generously, lovingly, in order that 
the text might offer me more in return.
It may sound far- fetched to talk of the relation between text and 
reader as like the relation between two lovers, but I think that is only be-
cause I am talking in metaphors: Sidney’s metaphors. What those meta-
phors lead us toward is a richly dynamic model of reading, a model 
that imagines the communion between text and reader as an intimate, 
loving engagement, with each idealizing the other, making demands, 
having designs, and moving from surface appearance to something 
more significant beneath. This model of reading has a clearly Platonic 
shape, but it is Sidney’s model, not Plato’s, and it is a model worked out 
in the space of metaphorical exchange between one set of ideas (about 
love) and another (about reading). We cannot finally answer the ques-
tion of how committed was Sidney to Platonism in general and Pla-
tonic love in particular. Plato, and the Neoplatonic tradition, certainly 
fired and molded Sidney’s thinking, but Sidney is a poet- theorist in a 
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deep sense: he synthesizes, imitates, takes and remakes ideas, he finds 
and creates resemblances, his practice is his theory and his theory is his 
practice. What we can say is that Sidney’s hermeneutics was explored 
and imaginatively articulated in Platonic terms. For Sidney, the poet en-
gages the reader in something like a dialogue;46 and the dialogic give 
and take of interpretation is like love. We may just be objects of a text’s 
affections, even spurning and failing to requite its love. Or we may mis-
read it by getting stuck on the textual surface. We may fall for it and in 
doing so find ourselves changing. But we may also love, or interpret, it 
more actively and see it respond and evolve in turn, as between us, text 
and reader, we climb a ladder of interpretation toward an elusive idea.47
University of Cambridge
46 Cf. my Writing After Sidney, chap. 1, esp. 2–5 and 29–30.
47 Versions of this article were presented as papers at a meeting of the British and 
Irish Spenser Seminar in Oxford, at the Renaissance Graduate Seminar in the Faculty of 
English at Cambridge, and at a conference on romance at the University of Dundee to cele-
brate the life and work of Victor Skretkowicz. I am grateful to those present on each occa-
sion for questions that clarified my thinking and for suggestions that extended my frame 
of reference, especially to Katrin Ettenhuber, Julian Lethbridge, and Noel Sugimura. I 
should like to thank Jane Wright for a generous and acute reading of a later draft, which 
did much to improve the final version, and for the helpful comments of SP’s readers and 
editor. This article is dedicated to the memory of Victor Skretkowicz.
